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Abstract— INTRODUCTION 
This paper introduces a preliminary review of the research 
currently performed in the field of Policy. This review aims to 
understand the approaches covered by main research streams in 
that area and to highlight the advantages of the essential and 
most renowned solutions. The review of the literature quickly 
provides a plethora of publications that presents innovative 
proposals on the matter of policy conceptual model, engineering 
methods, elicitation languages, as well as cases studies. It also 
brings out that the papers most often refer rather evasively to the 
organizational model layers when aligning and positioning their 
theory with organizational concepts. Consequently, it sounds 
useful to orient and improve our own developments in the 
purpose of ameliorate that issue. 
Based on that overview’s results, we are able to orient our 
researches more deeply by proposing an innovative approach 
that focuses in one hand on a policy model designed to take into 
account the responsibility of stakeholders and in the other hand 
on policy engineering method that takes care of business process 
while at the same time using requirement engineering principles. 
Responsibility is a notion that remains rarely addressed and that 
however embodies important and well-know concepts like 
accountability, capability and commitment. Moreover, 
responsibility constitutes a fundamental notion of management 
theory and is consequently identified as a meaningful bridge 
toward organizational artifacts. Exploiting process to define 
policy seems likewise to offer new research opportunities since 
process organizations become a more widely spread structured 
approach. 
Keywords- Policy concept; Responsibility; Corporate 
Governance; Right management; Business requirement; IT 
Governance 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is notable that nowadays, an aspect for a long time 
remained overshadowed appears to be from a major interest. 
This aspect is the responsibility committed from a person to 
perform a task. This responsibility is often perceived as a 
combination of rights and obligations. However, current 
business in financial sector for instance demonstrates that the 
moral aspect is improvable and that taking care of that matter 
would avoid in some cases malfunctions of the system. Our 
work starts based on the hypotheses that this responsibility is 
composed by the tuple {Capability, Accountability, and 
Commitment}. Our previous work [1] has introduced principal 
semantic characteristics about those three concepts and has 
brought formalizing elements using standard logical. 
It is rapidly observable when beginning to launch into 
policy literature that a very large amount of authors shows 
interest in that concern. Whatever that meaningful proliferation 
of works and states of the art with regard to it, it is noteworthy 
that up to now it doesn’t really exist some distinction between 
works addressing access control model, policy model, role 
engineering and permission/policy engineering. Based on that 
assumption, it appears substantial for apprehending that topic 
to clarify this point and to highlight the existing dichotomy 
between model and method. To perform our review, we will 
base our analysis on a commonly accepted idea that a model or 
conceptual model is a representation designed to show the 
structure of a system or concept and that (at least in our case), a 
method is a body of techniques for collecting data necessary to 
instantiate the conceptual model. Consequently and as 
illustration, the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model [2] 
proposes a structure for providing access based on role whereas 
role engineering [3] and [4] is a method aiming to define roles 
to instantiate the conceptual model. Identically, policy may 
also be modeled and it exists a proliferation of methods to 
instantiate it. These methods may be classified according to the 
technique they use. We propose to start with methods based on 
RE and to continue with a list of others. Moreover, it is more 
frequent to read paper targeting policy language than policy 
model. Those policy languages are innumerable and spread 
over the entire organizational model layers. Most famous of 
them are Ponder [5], Policy Description Language [6], Security 
Policy Language [7], and Rei [8]. Amazingly, the policy model 
used to support the policy expression by the policy language 
remains rarely specified. 
The next section introduces Camerer’s observations over 
researches in the domain of policy, section III reviews the 
concepts of responsibility in access control models and section 
IV reviews the same concepts in engineering methods. Section 
V concludes and presents future works. 
II. FROM BUSINESS TO SECURITY POLICY 
Before going ahead in the literature review, let make a hook 
to understand the analysis made by Camerer [9] on researches 
in business policy and strategy. An important observation in its 
work is that: « There are at least three symptoms of the disease 
causing the queasy dissatisfaction with policy research:  
a) Concepts are often ambiguous and their definitions 
are not agreed upon; 
b) Checklists or theories are rarely tested, and never 
tested directly against competing theories and 
c) Theories do not ‘cumulate’ or built upon previous 
theories as they should. 
These three deficiencies are a result of the way policy 
research is typically done.” 
Camerer explains that policy research should evolve from 
an inductive to a deductive approach. He argues that induction 
contribute to an unproductive debate about variable definitions 
and to a lack of testability and failure of theory. Unlikely, his 
conviction is that deductive models can express hypotheses in a 
language that is more amenable to progressive debate. This 
point of view is a precious warning we have to take into 
account before beginning our researcher in that it may prevent 
us to perpetrate the same mistakes. This warning is moreover 
substantial because of the still subjective character of the moral 
aspect under focus. In his work, Camerer only addresses 
business policy. Therefore, this consideration needs to be 
adapted according to our research’s context and it is 
consequently necessary to clarify the relation that exists 
between business policies and IT policies. Wies [10] shows the 
links between high and low-level policies. He depicts the 
variation of importance of the technology and the business 
aspects when translating high-level onto low-level policies. 
High-level policies tend to focus on business aspects whereas 
low-level policies focus on technology aspects. Although they 
are spread on different abstraction layers of the policy 
hierarchy, business policies and IT policies are consistent 
because both are derived from (management and/or IT) goals 
and hence embody (management and/or IT) strategy’s aspects. 
Rifaut et al. [11] propose to use GORE methods to define 
goals, strategies and policies. Rifaut explains that these 
methods can be used to analyse and model systems at all 
organizational level, from business models up to architectures, 
see Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  GORE model for policy refinement 
Based on the previous assumption that it exists links 
between policies from different layers, further analysis of the 
literature has been conducted to depict the principal elements 
that compose the policy concept. 
III. RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCESS CONTROL MODELS 
The state of the art of policy’s concepts introduces a review 
of 4 main recognized access control models: Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC), Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Role-
based Access Control (RBAC) and Usage Control Model 
(UCON). 
MAC is designed with the characteristic that one authority 
fixes the access right rules and that users are not permitted to 
modify them. MAC defines objects and subjects. Each objects 
and subjects are classified into classes and levels. Objects are 
resources to be protected whereas subjects are active entities 
that access objects. Lattice-based access control is a type of 
MAC policy. In that control, each access class is associated a 
security level and a set of category. The security level 
determines the level of sensibility of objects and subjects. I.e.: 
TopSecret>Secret>Confidential>Unclassified. The set of 
category corresponds to an area of competence or to a function. 
I.e.: Army, Navy, Nuclear, Administration. Access is allowed 
if subject clearance level >= object sensitivity level. The Bell-
LaPadula model has been developed in the same time that 
MAC and focuses on data confidentiality. The system is 
composed of objects, subjects and actions. Each object is 
associated to an access class that defined its level of sensibility 
and each subject is associated to a clearance. Subjects may 
exercise actions on objects: I.e. read-write [12]. This access 
control is mainly based on the concept of right. Subjects are not 
allowed to modify rules and both obligation and commitment 
of subject are not addressed. 
In DAC users may receive possibilities to define their own 
AC rules on some specific objects. In general, users are 
identified and it exists rules that determine who is allowed to 
perform what on which resources. One main recognized form 
of DAC is the access matrix. This matrix as been formalized by 
Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman through the HRU model that 
defines 6 types of primitive operations: enter or delete an 
action in the matrix, create or delete an object or a subject. The 
access matrix may however become difficult to managed and 
encompasses a big number of free cells that makes the matrix 
ineffective. Three others approaches have therefore been 
proposed: authorization tables, Access Control Lists (ACL), 
and capabilities. Authorization tables are composed of tuples 
{user, privilege and object} and are generally used for database 
management system. Those tables permit to reduce the size of 
the matrix. With ACL, an object is associated to a list of 
privileges that each subject have on object (I.e. unix: rwx r-x 
rw-). Finally, capabilities are represented by a list associated to 
each subject and that contains its access right towards objects. 
DAC also not addresses commitment and obligation. 
RBAC policy is a model that permits to effectively align 
access rights with the organizational structure of the company. 
RBAC is based on the principle that the most important 
information to access a resource is the role played by a user 
within the system [2]. A role is defined in RBAC as “a job 
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function within the context of an organization with some 
associated semantics regarding the authority and the 
responsibility conferred on the user assigned to the role”. That 
means that a user is associated to a role and that permissions 
are also associated to that role. 
RBAC model is a junction of many models: core RBAC 
(RBAC0), hierarchical RBAC (RBAC1), constrains RBAC 
(RBAC2) (static separation of duty relations and dynamic 
separation of duty relations) and constrains RBAC with role 
hierarchies (RBAC3). Core RBAC encompasses following 
elements: users (USERS) (human or sometime processes), 
roles (ROLES), objects (OBS) that are access resources, 
operations (OPS) that are processes that execute functions in 
the name of users and permissions (PRMS) that are 
authorizations to access system’s objects and that consequently 
establish links between objects and operations. 
The core RBAC also defines two kinds of relations between 
these elements: Firstly, user assignment (UA) that represent the 
relation between users and roles. Moreover a user may be 
affected to one or more roles and a role may encompass many 
users. Secondly, permission assignment (PA) defines the 
relation between roles and permissions. In the same way, much 
permission may be affected to many roles. Moreover, users-
roles connections are established by the sessions (SESSION). 
RBAC addresses the capability (AC), obligation is introduced 
by RBAC2 that imposes some rules for accessing objects and 
commitment remains not addressed. 
Park et al. [2] have introduced UCON in 2002. The term 
“usage” means the usage of rights upon digital objects. UCON 
joints in a unique model traditional access control as MAC, 
DAC and RBAC, trust management, and digital rights 
management (DRM). As explained previously, the traditional 
AC represents the control in a closed system where users are 
identified. The trust management system is used to assign 
authorization to unidentified subjects in an open environment 
like Internet. DRM assures access control to digital data and in 
that, the control is assured at the client-side. These three 
models are complementary and target different objectives. Park 
et al. argue that needs evolve and consequently that in some 
situations the usage of the three models together is justified and 
is made possible thanks to UCON. The model UCON 
encompasses Authorization, Obligation and Condition. 
Authorizations are functional attributes that must be evaluated 
before a usage decision and that return to the subject whether 
yes or no the access is granted over the object. Obligations are 
functional attributes that allow verifying if the subject has 
satisfied some conditions before and during the usage of the 
object. Conditions are decisional factors based on the 
environment or the system. The advantages of UCON are 
firstly that the model proposes a possibility of ongoing 
decision. That means that decision is taken before and during 
the usage. Secondly, the mutability of attributes that is an 
update of subject or object attributes after or during the usage. 
Our overview has also covered others approaches that due 
to the size of the paper are not presented here. In summary we 
may observe that firstly, some concepts are commonly 
accepted, such as right, role and obligation. Definition of the 
two firsts concepts are scarce. Only one definition has been 
found for the concept of “right”: the right (or permission) is 
explicitly granted to a subject to access an object in a specific 
mode, such as read or write [2]. For the concept of “role”, only 
one definition has also been found in Error! Reference source 
not found.. The concept of obligation is subject to more 
debate. For Bettini et al. [14], obligations are conditions or 
actions that must be fulfilled either by the users or the system 
after the decision. In [2], Sandhu et al. define obligations as 
requirements that have to be fulfilled by the subject for 
allowing access. Crook et al. [15] extend the notion of 
obligation to obligation policy that relate to actions that must 
be carried out on targets by subjects when a predefined event 
occurs and Haley et al. in Error! Reference source not found. 
define it as what actions must be taken before access can be 
granted. 
TABLE I.  AC MODEL AND RESPONSIBILITY COMPONENTS 
 MAC DAC RBAC UCON 
Subject Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Object Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group No User Group Role 
Defined by 
objects and 
subject’s 
attributes 
Capability Access 
Right 
Access 
Right 
Access Right Access 
Right 
Accountability 
(Obligation, 
Constraint) 
No No 
Yes, static et 
dynamic 
separation of 
duty 
Defined by 
objects and 
subject’s 
attributes 
Commitment No No No No 
 
IV. RESPONSIBILITY AND ENGINEERING METHODS 
This second part aims at analyzing some recognized 
engineering methods with the same objective to identify how 
they address responsibility. Even if number of work has 
already been produced to overview researches achieved in the 
domain of security policies requirement engineering 
[15][17][18] and Error! Reference source not found. none 
has targeted the responsibility through the tuple {Capability, 
Accountability and Commitment}. This section of the 
overview is focused on policy engineering methods that use 
software requirement engineering methods for defining policy 
requirements. The requirement engineering considers the 
functional requirement and the « quality » requirement (or no-
functional).  
KAOS is a goal-oriented software requirement engineering 
approach that allows calculating requirements from goal 
diagrams. KAOS stands for Knowledge Acquisition in 
automated specification or Keep All Objects Satisfied. KAOS 
permits to specify high-level requirements and defines a set of 
“meta-concepts” and “meta-relationships”. Some of the meta-
concepts may be used to AC. The agent component is an 
important one and is defined as either human beings or 
automated components that are responsible for achieving 
requirements and expectations. To achieve the requirement, the 
agent has capabilities. KAOS defines the responsibility as the 
relationship that connects an agent to a requirement for which 
the agent is responsible. Fontaine [20] has used KAOS to 
refine security needs in authorization rules and in security 
policies. Whatever, KAOS is not the solution to design all 
kinds of policy such as for example delegation policy. 
The i* framework is an agent-oriented modeling 
framework, Yu et al. [21], that supports goal-oriented strategic 
modeling and analysis of requirements by using three mains 
concepts that are: actors, intentional elements, and links. Actors 
are described in their organizational setting and have attributes 
such as goals, abilities, beliefs, and commitments. Actors can 
be agents, roles, and positions. Agents are concrete actors, 
systems or humans, with specific capabilities. It was initially 
used to analyze and model business processes and now, it 
evolves to the development of model for security and privacy 
requirements. I* doesn’t provide any method to identify and 
define roles and permissions but it allows to model relations 
between actors. More particularly, Liu et al. demonstrate in 
[22] how it is possible to derive AC restriction when using the 
actor boundary in a Strategic Rationale (SR) model. The SD 
diagram represents the strategic dependencies of the actors. A 
dependency is an “agreement” between 2 actors. 
Goal-Based Requirements Analysis Method (GBRAM) 
[23] aims at representing a system and its environment as a 
collection of agents. The agent has to achieve a goal based on 
the assumed responsibility for it. 
Crook et al. propose in 2003 [15][17] and [24] a framework 
named Analytical Role Modeling Framework (ARMF) for 
modeling roles according to the RBAC model. The 
particularity of its approach is that it is based on the Mintzberg 
theory [25] that classifies roles according to three categories 
that he integrates in the framework. Those categories issue 
from the organizational model are: « Roles based on seniority 
», « Roles based on function » and « Roles based on market ». 
ARMF encompasses 2 levels: a « meta-level » that include 
roles-types, asset category, and context-types. Those key 
conceptual components permit to define access policies. The 
second level is the instance level that provides instantiated 
answers about users, context, assets and roles (types: 
«functional», «seniority» and «contextual»). Unlike 
requirement engineering methods such as KAOS, GBRAM and 
methods based on Uses Cases, that only take into account 
definitions of actors or agents, and in addition to the i* 
framework that only addresses one differentiation between 
different type of roles (roles based on “position” and based on 
“task” to accomplish), ARMF introduces a context, contextual 
roles, a hierarchy between assets and a hierarchy between roles. 
Moreover, ARMF permits to present contextual role by 
establishing links between the asset and the context and 
between the context and the role. In the example included in 
[17], Crook also uses Formal Tropos to prove that its 
framework to model security policies respects the principal of 
minimum privilege. 
Qingfeng et al. [26] ‘s framework is named (Requirements-
level AC Analysis Framework (RACAF) and defined 4 types 
of analysis that each addresses different requirement of the 
access control. The first analysis is a « Data Analysis » that 
permits to obtain information that must be collected by the 
system, privacy preferences over that data, the type of data and 
the data that must be protected by access control. The second 
analysis is a « Goal/Scenario-Based Task Analysis ». This 
analysis permits to identify the task to perform and derive from 
it the objectives, permissions, obligations and the context. 
From the scenario analysis, it is also possible to extract event 
sequences that include actors, actions, permissions, pre-
conditions and post-condition. The third analysis is the « 
Organizational Structure Analysis ». This analysis' target is to 
identify the existing relationship between actors and 
consequently the organizational hierarchy, the delegation and 
the roles. The last analysis is the «Information Flow Analysis» 
that is interesting because it analyzes the flow of information 
outside the company. The method proposed by Qingfeng 
begins with a Non-Functional Requirement (NFR) analysis. 
NFR are assimilated to soft goals, it means that those goals 
must be satisfied to a certain limit rather than absolutely having 
to be satisfied. The NFR framework defines the design of the 
system, whatever access control is treated as a solution to 
answer soft goals of confidentiality. Further development of 
Qingfeng’s work [26] has led to a goal-driven framework for 
modeling privacy requirements in the role engineering process. 
The aim of this 2 phases approach is to make a bridge between 
high-level privacy requirements and low-level access control 
policy. The first phase is the Role Permission Engineering 
(RPE) during which the business processes and tasks are 
analyzed by applying goal and scenario oriented requirement 
engineering. The results of this phase are roles and permissions 
both are compatible with the RBAC model. The second phase 
is the Role Permission Refinement (RPR) is a refining phase of 
role and permission according to the organizational structure, 
policy statement, etc.  
Gustaf Neumann et al. have based their work on a method 
of role engineering based on the scenario-driven techniques [3]. 
A scenario is a part of a task that is part of a “work profile”. 
Moreover the scenario may be considered as a set of step on 
which are associated operations with specifics accesses. A 
subject that performs a scenario must consequently possess all 
permissions necessary to perform each step of the scenario. 
Seven main activities are identified by Neumann et al.: Identify 
and model usage scenarios, Derive permissions from scenarios, 
Identify constraints, Refine scenario model, Define tasks and 
work profiles, Derive preliminary role-hierarchy, Define 
RBAC Model. A set of documents is issued from these 
activities. I.e.: scenario model, permission catalog, constraint 
catalog, task definitions, work profile and the RBAC model. 
This RBAC model is the final result of the role engineering and 
encompasses all the roles of the system organized in one or 
more hierarchy. The role finding method proposed declines the 
responsibility through permissions that are derived from 
scenario and through constraints to be enforced on permissions. 
These constraints are however technical and need to be 
managed by the system, i.e.: separation of duties or 
cardinalities. They may not be considered as responsibility's 
constructs. 
Another approach lies in using uses cases. In its paper [27], 
Fernandez et al. explain that an existing method to determine 
the functional requirement is the usage of uses cases. Users of 
the system are interviewed in order to express the way they 
interact with the system. Fernandez proposes a method to 
determine need for a role considering the uses case and a 
security administrator defines authorization rules based on all 
the uses cases over the system. Uses cases are described with a 
title, actors (that could be roles, users, or other systems), pre-
conditions, descriptions, exceptions, and post-conditions. 
Access rights to specific object are thereafter declined from 
uses cases. Theses access rights are then translated under the 
following format: (S, O, T, P) for respectively (subject, Object, 
Type of authorized access, optional constraint). Uses cases 
only permit to define functional specifications. Consequently 
Fernandez proposes uses cases extension with the aim of taken 
into account non-functional requirement (such as the security). 
To achieve that, he uses stereotype, in other words UML meta- 
classification elements. Within these elements, there are the 
fault tolerance or the security. Actors deduct rights associated 
to roles from uses cases considering methods that have to be 
invoked. Therefore, in a scenario diagram, when an actor 
interacts with an object by a method, than the use case provide 
a set of access rights. The access right such as the one defined 
by Fernandez is represented by the tuple R (A, M, O) with A: 
the actor, O: the object, and M: the method. For Fernandez, 
some tools such as Paradigm+ or Rational Rose that are 
developed to present use cases could be extended in a way to 
generate needed authorization rules. 
Pete A. Epstein [18] proposes a model named 
Role/Permission Assignment Model (RPAM) that allows 
decomposing and aggregating role attribution to permission. 
Epstein based his work on three approaches. The first one is the 
role-finding approach.  
Roeckle et al. [28] propose a process-oriented based 
approach for defining role. To achieve that, he uses a three-
layers meta-model: process, roles and access right. In [29], 
Roeckle presents its work in progress for role-finding based on 
a process-based approach.  
Chandramouli [29] proposes a framework named Dynamic 
Authorization Framework for Multiple Authorization Types 
(DAFMAT) that defines a 5 steps methodology for defining 
access control service for an information system in the 
healthcare domain.  
The model proposed in [30] is issued from the work of 
Thomsen et al. The objective of this model is to aggregate 
different permission to a role by using 3 layers that are: Local 
Policy, Semantic Policy and Application Policy. 
Ponder [5] and [31] is an object oriented policy language 
for the management of distributed systems and networks. 
Ponder provide the ability to group policies and structure them 
to reflect organizational structure and preserve the natural way 
system administrators operate. 
XACML stand for eXtensible Access Control Markup 
Language and is a policy language that has been specified for 
access control [32]. It defines a core schema and corresponding 
namespace for the expression of authorization policies in XML 
against objects that are themselves identified in XML. 
TABLE II.  ENGINEERING METHODS AND RESPONSIBILITY’S CONCEPT 
 KAOS I* GBRAM ARMF RACAF Scenario Driven Uses Cases 
Subject Agent Actors Agent Users Actors Subject Actors 
Object Yes Yes - Asset Data - Object 
Group - Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Capability (Right, 
Authorization) Authorization rules 
Abilities 
 and beliefs - Permission Permission Permission Access right 
Accountability (Obligation, 
Constraint) 
Achieve requirements  
and expectations Goal 
Achieve  
a goal 
Perform 
 a task 
Perform 
a task 
Perform 
 a scenario 
Pre-conditions, 
post-conditions 
Commitment No Yes No No No No No 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
We have analyzed the literature to understand the semantics 
of AC policy conceptual models and engineering methods. We 
have observed that some elements are commonly accepted 
components whereas others remain overshadowed. Subject is 
the basic component and is most of the time associated to a 
group. Subject appears as a person, a system or a software 
component. The most famous group type is the role. Object is 
also a basic component and could take a large scale of 
representation. I.e.: the performance of a scenario. Capability is 
a component that is part of all models and methods. Capability 
is most frequently declined under access right, authorizations 
or permissions. Accountability is a component that exists 
mainly in engineering methods and that is declined as the 
obligation to achieve a task or to perform an action. 
Commitment is the most infrequent concept. I* introduces 
some elements of it (I.e. when defining dependency as an 
“agreement” between 2 actors) but it remains interpretable if it 
is a moral concept or an obligation. 
Based upon that observation, we state firstly that because 
the most addressed concern of the capability is the access right, 
existing models and methods most of the time remain targeting 
low-level abstract layers of the organization. Secondly, if we 
consider responsibility as a tuple {Capability, Accountability 
and Commitment}, we may assert that it doesn’t exist 
nowadays model and method that entirely take into account all 
responsibility’s components. 
Consequently, our future works will focus on continuing 
the development of the model of responsibility, and most 
specially the concept of commitment that could be the most 
valuable one when climbing up to the high-level layer of the 
organizational model. 
Another part of our works will aim at defining a new 
approach for derivate the responsibility from the high-level 
down to the lower one. Our first researches demonstrate that 
potentials solutions are to links responsibility’s concepts with 
organization’s processes. 
As a conclusion regarding the Camerer’s warning of section 
II, we have done this analysis to clarify the semantic of all 
components that encompass the responsibility and we may 
consequently state that symptom a) and c) identified by 
Camerer has been addressed. Firstly the symptom a) that is 
“Concepts are often ambiguous and their definitions are not 
agreed upon” has been partially bypassed with clear literature 
based enlightenment of the concepts. Secondly symptom c) 
that is “Theories do not ‘cumulate’ or built upon previous 
theories as they should.” has been addresses with a tentative 
definition of “responsibility” considering the way its 
conceptual component are addresses by others authors. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
SIM “Secure Identity Management” is an R&D project of 
the CRP Henri Tudor achieved in collaboration with the 
University of Luxembourg funded by the National Research 
Fund Luxembourg. Additionally, I would like to thank Pr. 
Michaël Petit from the University of Namur for its valuable 
feedback during the preparation of this paper. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Christophe Feltus, André Rifaut, An Ontology for Requirements 
Analysis of Managers’ Policies in Financial Institutions, I-ESA2007, 
Madeira, Portugal. 
[2] R. Sandhu, J. Park, Usage Control: A Vision for Next Generation Access 
Control, The Second International Workshop on Mathematical Methods, 
Models and Architectures for Computer Networks Security, 2003. 
[3] Gustaf Neumann, Mark Strembeck, A Scenario-driven Role Engineering 
Process for Functional RBAC Roles, SACMAT’02, June 34, 2002, 
Monterey, California, USA. 
[4] Coyne, E. J. 1996. Role engineering. First ACM Workshop on Role-
Based Access Control, Gaithersburg, Maryland, United States.  
[5] N. Damianou, N. Dulay, E. Lupu, M. Sloman , The Ponder Policy 
Specification Language Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems 
and Networks (Policy2001), HP Labs Bristol, 29-31. Springer-Verlag. 
[6] Bertino, E., Mileo, A., and Provetti, A. 2005. PDL with Preferences. 
IEEE international Workshop on Policies For Distributed Systems and 
Networks, Policy 2005 – Vol. 00, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, 
DC, 213-222. 
[7] Basile, C.; Lioy, A.; Perez, G. Martinez; C., F. J. Garcia; Skarmeta, A. 
F. Gomez, POSITIF: A Policy-Based Security Management 
SystemPolicies for Distributed Systems and Networks, 2007. 
POLICY’07, pp. 280 – 280. 
[8] Lalana Kagal, Rei : A Policy Language for the Me-Centric Project, 
TechReport, HP Labs, September 2002. 
[9] Colin Camerer, Redirecting Research in Business Policy and Strategy, 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol.6, No. 1. (Jan. – Mar., 1985), pp. 1-
15. 
[10] René Wies, Using a Classification of Management Policies for Policy 
Specification and Policy Transformation. In Proc. ISINM '95, Santa 
Barbara, California, May 1995. 
[11] André Rifaut, Christophe Feltus, Improving Operational Risk 
Management Systems by Formalizing the Basel II Regulation with Goal 
Models and the ISO/IEC 15504 Approach, REMO2V’2006, 
Luxembourg. 
[12] Davrondhon Gafurov, Kirsi Helkala, Nils Kalstad Svendsen, Security 
models for electronic medical record, Telektronikk 1.2005. 
[13] David F. Ferraiolo, Ravi Sandhu, Serban Gavrila, D. Richard Kuhn and 
Ramaswamy Chandramouli, Proposed NIST Standard for Role-Based 
Access Control, ACM Transactions on Information and System 
Security, Vol. 4, No. 3, August 2001, Pages 224-274. 
[14] C. Bettini, S. Jajodia, X. S. Wang, and D. Wijesekera, Provisions and 
Obligations in Policy Management and Security Applications, 28th 
VLDB conference, China, 2002. 
[15] Robert Crook, Darrel Ince, Bashar Nuseibeh, Modelling access policies 
using roles in requirements engineering, Information and Software 
Technology 45 (2003) 979-991. 
[16] Charles B. Haley, Robin C. Laney, Jonathan D. Moffett, and Bashar 
Nuseibeh, Using Trust Assumptions with Security Requirements, 
Requirements Engineering Journal, vol. 11 no. 2 (April 2006) pp. 138-
15. 
[17] Robert Crook, Darrel Ince, Bashar Nuseibeh, On Modelling access 
policies: Relating Roles to their Organisational Context, RE 2005, Paris. 
[18] Pete A. Epstein, Engineering of Role/Permission Assignement, PhD 
thesis. 
[19] Crook, R., Ince, D., and Nuseibeh, B., “Using i* to Model Access 
Policies: Relating Roles to their Organisational Context”, Social 
Modelling for Requirements Engineering, Giorgini, P., Maiden, N., 
Mylopoulos, J., and Yu, E., eds., MIT Press, 2006. 
[20] P.J. Fontaine, Goal-Oriented Elaboration of Security Requirements. 
M.S. Thesis, Dept. Computing Science, University of Louvain, June 
2001. 
[21] Yu, E. S. and Liu, L. 2001. Modelling Trust for System Design Using 
the i* Strategic Actors Framework. Workshop on Deception, Fraud, and 
Trust in Agent Societies Held During the Autonomous, Eds. Lecture 35 
194. 
[22] L. Liu, E. Yu, J. Mylopoulos, Analyzing Security Requirements as 
Relationships Among Strategic Actors, SREIS’02, Raleigh, North 
Carolina, 2002. 
[23] A. Antón, Goal-Based Requirements Analysi,. Second ICRE’96, 
Colorado Springs, USA, 1996. 
[24] Robert Crook, Darrel Ince, Bashar Nuseibeh, Towards an Analytical 
Role Modelling Framework for Security Requirements, Security 
Requirements Group, Departement of Computing, The Open University, 
Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK. 
[25] Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organisations, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983. pp. 312  
[26] Qingfeng He, Annies I. Antón, “A Framework for Privacy-Enhanced 
Access Control Analysis in Requirements Engineering”, Proc. of the 9th 
International Workshop on Requirements Engineering: Foundation for 
Software Quality (REFSQ'03), pp. 137-146, Klagenfurt/Velden, Austria, 
June 16-17, 2003. 
[27] E. B. Fernandez and J. C. Hawkins, “Determining Role Rights from Use 
Cases”, Proc. of the ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control, 
1997. 
[28] Roeckle, H., Schimpf, G., and Weidinger, R. 2000. Process-oriented 
approach for role-finding to implement role-based security 
administration in a large industrial organization. In Proceedings of the 
Fifth ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control (Berlin, Germany, 
July 26 - 28, 2000). Role-Based Access Control '00. 
[29] Chandramouli, R. 2001. A Framework for Multiple Authorization Types 
in a Healthcare Application System. 17th Annual Computer Security 
Applications Conference, 2001. ACSAC. IEEE Computer Society, 
Washington, DC, 137.  
[30] D. J. Thomsen, Richard C. O'Brien and C. Payne, Napoleon: Network 
Application Policy Environment, ACM Workshop on Role-Based 
Access Control, 1999, pp. 145-152. 
[31] N. Dulay, E. Lupu, M. Solman, N. Damianou, A Policy Deployment 
Model for the Ponder Language , An extended version of paper in Proc. 
IEEE/IFIP International Symposium on Integrated Network 
Management, (IM’2001), Seattle, May 2001, IEEE Press. 
[32] OASIS, “eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACM) 
Version 2.0” February 2005. www.oasis-open.org/committees/xacml/
 
